A little over 2 years ago, I
posted my Theses on the Korean Problem,* concluding:
The President’s [then-, and before at
least two later escalations of the trade war, recently tweeted] suggestion that
China would get a better trade deal by taking unspecified measures against the
Pyongyang regime will be given no warmer reception as a “tweet” than it was
given over the luncheon table at Mar al Lago.
From the domestic U.S. perspective, it
should be noted that by his own terms, Trump is offering to allow China to
continue “raping” the U.S. and stealing the jobs of American workers if China
will help us out with our North Korean problem.
This is what he calls “making America great again.” What is to be feared is that Trump will take
out his frustration with China in some rash action against North Korea. Hit them with a few Tomahawks, and
they will hit back.
We have no way of knowing
whether Trump has persisted in his attempt to link U.S.-China trade peace to Chinese
support against the Pyongyang regime, or at what stage he might renew that
effort. Whether it produces any concrete
improvement in our Central American refugee crisis or not, the superficial
success of his recent Mexican gambit can only serve to increase the chances Trump
will, contrary to the (potentially frantic) urgings of his trade negotiators,
try linking a deal with China to some anti-Kim commitment from Beijing. If Trump does this and is insistent about it,
it would certainly mean that no trade deal happens. Whether a moment of maximum leverage is
approaching for Xi, and if so what moment that might be, are subjects for a separate
posting, however.
As for the Korean situation,
Trump’s personal diplomacy and his bruited warm friendship with Little Rocket
Man have taken the Tomahawk Chop “off the table,” at least until Trump is
willing to renounce his friendship with Kim.
Not even Fox News would be able to spin that development as anything
other than an admission that Trump’s huge charisma and magical deal-making
powers somehow failed to work on the Korean problem. Actually, no significant new anti-Pyongyang
measure could be taken by the Administration without making the same admission
(tacitly, of course – frank admissions never come from this White House).
Kim has already demonstrated
his ability to take advantage of this “friendship.” Over a year since the first love-feast has
passed, and not only has there been no progress toward de-nuclearization, but Pyongyang
has even: (1.) published its definition of that term, which begins with the
removal from the Korean peninsula of all forces of that notorious nuclear
power, the U.S. of A.; (2.) openly pressed forward with development of short-
and medium-range ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear warheads; and
(3.) probably opened at least one new secret underground facility for uranium
enrichment. There is no reason to
suppose that Kim has done anything but (at a minimum) improve his ability to
sprint to the compilation of a substantial stockpile of nuclear weapons and the
completion of a capable ICBM, as soon as he may feel either confident of doing
so in secrecy or free to renounce any commitment to denuclearization. Yet Trump has not done so much as press for a
deadline for future talks.
Trump’s boasting about his
personal diplomacy and the skepticism of all expert opinion on the subject are
bound to create one of the themes of the 2020 Presidential campaign. Sometime in the latter stages of the campaign
– August or October? – will come a period during which the obvious explosion of
the Trump-Kim “friendship” would provide the most useful material for Trump’s
opponent to use against him (I was going to say, “would prove the most embarrassing
for the Trump forces,” but the shameless cannot feel embarrassment).
Kim, who has the measure of Trump
and is determined to solidify his permanent membership in the nuclear club, surely
knows this. A breakout move on his nuclear
stockpile or ICBM or both at this time, however solemnly attested by the hated “intelligence
community,” would simply be denied by the Administration as long as Kim does
Trump the favor of denying it himself. Any
doubt that this will work for Trump, at least as well as the rest of his
playing to the base works, should be dispelled by the mere mention of the names
Vladimir Putin and Mohammad bin Salman.
Kim’s goal is presumably the
Finlandization of South Korea. When he
has plenty of nukes and the missiles to land them with anywhere in his
neighborhood, while the U.S. is still whistling his tune of denial and kumbaya,
then South Korea, Taiwan and Japan will face the stark choice: continue to ignore
the demise of the American post-War order or accept satellitization by
Communist China/North Korea. Will the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty evaporate under the rays of a new Rising Sun,
or is Japan a permanently spent force that knows it is spent? And which outcome will be worse for Great-Again
America?
Such were the questions on
the table at the Two Pleasant Luncheons in the East, but we may be sure that only
one side recognized them.
* Theses on the Korean Problem
