Theses on the Korean Problem

Theses on the Korean Problem

Major Propositions:

1.      The road distance from Dandong on the Yalu to Shenyang (historically, Mukden) pop. ca. 7 million, is about 100 miles, to Beijing about 550 miles. Korea's border of almost 1,000 miles stretches along two of China's historical Three Eastern Provinces whose combined population exceeds 70 million.

2.      South Korea's combination of a vibrant market-oriented economy with a lively democracy enjoying wide participation would have made a worrisome neighbor and model to the Chinese Communist regime before the recent fall of the government in Seoul.  Spontaneous large-scale demonstrations against corruption leading to replacement of top leaders is probably the stuff of nightmares for CPC leadership.  To them, South Korea looks like an American colony, only worse.

3.      China could cause the present North Korean regime to disappear with relative ease; replacing it – as the U.S. recently learned in Iraq – is another matter altogether.

4.      The reunification of Germany could be taken as a model for the likely form that reunification of Korea would take if the Communist regime in the North were to fall – except that the GDR was much closer to economic and cultural parity with its Western-oriented counterpart than North Korea is to South Korea, and therefore the triumph of capitalism can be expected to be much more rapid and complete.

5.      Again resorting to the German analogy, the Pyongyang regime of the Workers’ Party of Korea is clearly more brittle, less capable of adaptation and accommodation than was the Berlin establishment run by the Socialist Unity Party.  In other words, the existing totalitarian system in North Korea must either remain in total and rigid control or else vanish.  Its fall would create a vacuum which the South Korean system would inevitably and fully occupy.

Lesser Propositions:

6.      Because it is one of the Big Five, all of whom would necessarily prefer that only the Big Five have nuclear weapons, if for no other reason – and there are a number of other reasons – China cannot be happy with the present North Korean regime.

7.      Despite the long border, the nature of Han Chinese society and of the CPC’s (now semi-) totalitarian regime would make it relatively easy for China to deal with any “flood of refugees” resulting from upheaval on the Korean peninsula.  Refugees simply would not get in, or if they did they’d be rapidly and unceremoniously transported back, whatever degree of coercive force might be needed.

Inferences:

To the Chinese government, the inherent problems presented by the continuation of the present regime in Pyongyang are much less serious than the highly likely negative consequences of the collapse of that regime, and such collapse would likely ensue if Pyongyang were subjected to any serious meddling.  Those negative consequences are of existential dimensions (from the CPC perspective) and therefore Beijing would be induced to “lean” seriously on Pyongyang only by extremely serious and effective external pressure.  But no other power, including the U.S., is in a position to exert such pressure.

The President’s suggestion that China would get a better trade deal by taking unspecified measures against the Pyongyang regime will be given no warmer reception as a “tweet” than it was given over the luncheon table at Mar al Lago

From the domestic U.S. perspective, it should be noted that by his own terms, Trump is offering to allow China to continue “raping” the U.S. and stealing the jobs of American workers if China will help us out with our North Korean problem.  This is what he calls “making America great again.”  What is to be feared is that Trump’s will take out his frustration with China in some rash action against North Korea.  Hit them with a few Tomahawks, and they will hit back.