I was going to file this Monday. AG Brnovich doesn't know it, but he was saved by the bell.
Media reports list Arizona as one of the states entering the suit on the side of Texas, but that's not accurate. Arizona, through Brnovich, moved tor leave to file an amicus brief, but made it clear its brief would essentially say nothing. I don't know how many more of the "18 other states" made or proposed similar filings.
Of the two main reasons for the US Supreme Court to refuse to touch the case, Plaintiff Texas' lack of standing and non-justiciability under the political question doctrine, I believe the latter would have been the better choice.
No. 22 O 155
Supreme Court of the
United States
_________________
STATE OF TEXAS,
Plaintiff,
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, ET AL.,
Defendants.
_________________
On Motion for Leave to File a Bill of Complaint and
Motion for Injunctive Relief, etc.
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF
of Brian K. Stanley as Amicus Curiae
Motion for Leave to File Brief
as Amicus Curiae
Pursuant
to Supreme Court Rule 37.2(b), the attorney undersigned respectfully moves for
leave to file the accompanying brief as amici curiae. Because of the emergency
nature of this action, the proposed amicus has been unable to secure the
consent of the parties.
This
proposed amicus is an Arizona citizen who is embarrassed by the state’s Motion
for Leave to File an Amicus Brief. It is
difficult to understand the motivation behind this mealy-mouthed, neither-for-nor-against
document, unless it is to enable Attorney General Brnovich to tell a fractious
and illiterate portion of the populace that he sure has joined in on that Texas
“big show” lawsuit without incurring too much professional embarrassment.
Arizona
says that its proposed brief would argue that (1.) “election integrity is of
paramount importance” and (2.) “if this Court exercises jurisdiction over
Texas’s complaint, it is equally important that the Court act quickly.”
“Argument”
1 is merely an unhelpful platitude.
Argument 2 also states an incontrovertible proposition while providing
no direct assistance to the Court.
Arizona ought to have pursued this point further: (A.) If the Court were to take jurisdiction
of Texas’ proposed action, it would be critically important to the life of the
Nation that such action be resolved very quickly. (B.) Texas’ proposed action, if entertained
by the Court, could not be resolved quickly.
Therefore (C.) It is critically important to the life of the Nation that
the Court decline to take jurisdiction of Texas’ proposed action.
Arizona
could make this argument without compromising its traditional position that the
Court’s original jurisdiction of actions between states is non-discretionary
simply by recognizing that under the established “political question” doctrine
Texas’ proposed complaint is non-justiciable ab initio. The point is well made in Part II, pp. 12 –
16 of Georgia’s opposition memorandum.
Arizona would make a helpful contribution by simply joining in this part
of Georgia’s opposition.
Arizona
could go further and amplify the political question argument:
A controversy is nonjusticiable – i. e., involves a political question
– where there is “a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the
issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it … .”
Baker v. Carr,
369 U. S. 186, 217 (1962).
Article II, § 1 of the Constitution and the XIIth
Amendment demonstrate textually the commitment of Presidential elections to the
state legislatures, the electoral college and Congress, each of which must be
recognized, for Presidential election purposes, as a “coordinate political
department.” But now the second alternative
limb of the political question test is equally if not more important. The lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving Texas’ proposed complaint would alone be
sufficient reason for refusing to entertain it.
Even a cursory review of Texas’
lengthy and multifarious complaint will convince the reader with any experience
of legal procedures that it is a roadmap for years or decades of litigation.
Some
tortuous legal problems are presented, such as drawing a boundary between
permissible administrative regulation and practice and impermissible executive
revision of legislatively imposed requirements (as well as distinguishing
between actions election administrators are required to perform and actions
they are permitted to perform). E.g.,
Proposed Complaint ¶¶ 62, 63. While such
questions were argued and briefed to, then decided by, a special master, the master’s
report considered by the Court and the Court’s opinion(s) drafted, who would
have his finger on the nuclear launch button?
But
the serious legal issues raised by the Proposed Complaint are discernable
and manageable through judicial child’s play compared with some of the
potential fact issues. Such abstruse
expert questions as underlie Texas’ “quadrillion to one” statistical claim (¶
10) would be bad enough. But the really
fact-intensive issues, such as whether exclusion of unsigned mail-in ballots
would affect the outcome in Pennsylvania (¶¶ 41 – 46) or whether the “premature
removal of ballots from their locked containers” in that state (¶51) affected
any votes at all, are clearly unmanageable within any realistic allocation of
judicial resources or acceptable period of time.
Further,
entertainment of Texas’ suit would invite countersuits by the states that
president-elect Biden carried, who would naturally and rightly want recounts in
other states to see if Trump would have won the states in his column if mail-in
ballots were excluded. Taking jurisdiction
of Texas’ complaint might not destroy the Nation, but it would certainly
destroy the Court.
Arizona says it wants to argue that if the Court accepts
jurisdiction it will be vitally important that it resolve the action
quickly. It ought to have looked more
seriously at the Proposed Complaint and recognized that Texas’ complaint could
not, within any tolerable period of time, be resolved in any judicially
respectable fashion, and it should have drawn the conclusion that the
established political question doctrine must be applied to rule this
controversy non-justiciable.
December 14, 2020. Respectfully submitted,
/s/Brian
K. Stanley
Brian K. Stanley
1938
E. Osborn Rd.
Phoenix,
Arizona 85016
602-956-9201
court@brianstanleylaw.com